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From a time when electoral shifts in The 
Netherlands were minor tremors hardly detect- 
able to other than the political seismologists, 
elections now produce changes of greater force 
on the political Richter scale, easily noticeable 
by even the most casual observer. The decline 
in religious voting since the mid 1960s and the 
breakdown in socialization whereby younger 
voters no longer automatically follow the 
patterns of their parents have greatly increased 
the ‘floating vote’. As many as one-third of the 
voters now switch their preference between 
elections, and almost one-fifth of the voters now 
say that they determine this preference during 
the last weeks or days before the election. This 
increase in floating has brought about a less 
stable balance among the political parties. 
Because there are now more votes to be won 
during the campaign and because the formation 
of the Cabinet is more dependent upon the 
electoral results, the importance of campaigns 
and elections has increased greatly. It is against 
such a background that the election of 1982 
must be viewed and interpreted. 
Background 
The changes which have occurred in patterns 
of voting have been discussed in far greater 
detail than is possible here.’ As one of the most 
important functions of elections is to provide 
the basis for the formation of a new Cabinet, 
the effects of these changes in voting can be 
understood by examining the balance of parlia- 
mentary seats. This shift in relative strength 
among the parties has in turn influenced the 
importance of the elections themselves. 
* The assistance of Ron Hillebrand has been 
invaluable in the preparation of this note. The 
comments of Hans Daalder have also been 
greatly appreciated. 
There are two main points which must be 
made in connection with Table 1. The most 
important change to be seen is the alteration in 
the position of the major religious parties. Prior 
to 1967 these parties held a majority of the 
seats in the Second Chamber of Parliament and 
could, at least theoretically, have chosen to 
form a government themselves without taking a 
partner from among the other parties. Since 
then, however, they have dropped to slightly 
less than a third of the seats. Because of their 
position at the centre, they have still served in 
all cabinets, but now are forced to choose a 
coalition partner. On occasion, the electoral 
results have limited this choice, since the 
Christian Democratic-Liberal combination failed 
to achieve a majority of the seats necesm 
sary to provide a viable alternative. In such 
cases, it is either necessary to bring in a smaller 
party (DS’70 in 1971) or accept the other 
alternative of a coalition with the Left. The 
degree of discretion has become limited and the 
importance of the electoral results increased. 
The second important point concerns the 
changes in voting behaviour which underlie 
these results. When ‘verzuiling’ was at its 
highest in The Netherlands, voters were social- 
ized into one of the parties through group 
membership and shifts between parties were 
minimal. With some exceptions, campaigns 
tended to be defensive. Voters could hardly be 
won, but might be lost, particularly to splinter 
parties. As group identification loosened as the 
basis for vote determination, factors such as 
issues (including ideological conflicts), images, 
and party leaders became increasingly impor- 
tant in wooing the new floating vote. 
The Left, in particular, attempted a strategy 
of polarization in order to force wavering 
religious voters to choose between Right and 
Left. In Table 1, we see that this strategy has 
had limited success. The size of the Left vote, 
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TABLE 1. Distribution of seats (Second Chamber). 1946 198 1 
1946 1948 1952 1956 1959 1963 1967 1971 1972 1977 1981 
Small Left parties 10 8 0 7 5 8 10 9 10 0 9 
PvdA (Labour, 
Socialists) 29 27 30 50 /ix ‘13 17 39 ,‘13 53 4 4 
D’h6 7 11 0 8 17 
Major religious 
parties 51 54 51 77 75 76 69 58 38 49 4x 
(since 1977 CDA: 
Christian Democrats) 
DS’70 8 0 1 
VVD (Liberals) 0 8 9 11 19 10 17 10 22 28 26 
Small Right parties 2 3 /i 3 3 7 11 8 9 5 6 
dSecond Chamber was expanded from 100 to 150 seats. 
including D’66, has at times increased. and in 
1977 the Labour Party actually became larger 
than the combined list of the major religious 
parties. Still, it has been the Liberal Party 
which has grown more in this period. Begin- 
ning in 1972 they selected a new leader, Hans 
Wiegel, who helped change the party’s image 
and move it in the direction of a mass party. 
As the background for the 1982 election. 
these two changes became of increasing impor- 
tance. Because it is likely that the Queen will 
turn to the largest party to initiate negotiations 
for the formation of a new government, it has 
become increasingly important to be the largest 
party in Parliament. In addition to the impor- 
tance of the largest party, electoral outcomes 
may now determine which options are available 
for the formation of a government. Thus, in 
terms of the selection of a future government. 
the most pressing questions surrounding the 
1982 election were, which party would emerge 
as largest and what combinations could poten- 
tially form a majority cabinet. 
Campaign 1982 
In some respects, the 1982 campaign was 
rooted in events of 1977. In that year, the 
Socialists, under Joop Den Uyl, achieved their 
greatest post-war success. Yet they failed in the 
cabinet negotiations, and returned to the oppo- 
sition Instead, the Christian Democrats, led by 
Dries van Agt, turned to the Liberals.? The 
Socialists were, of course, quite disappointed 
and frustrated with the results of the formation 
and it served to fire the irritation which existed 
between the two leaders. 
In 1981 the same four men headed the 
major party tickets as in 1977. The economy 
had worsened under the van Agt- Wiegel 
administration, but Den Uyl and the Socialists 
had been uninspiring in opposition. Voters 
seemed confused and D’h6 was able to capital- 
ize handsomely on its slogan as the ‘Reasonable 
Alternative’. Although the government coali- 
tion eventually lost only three seats, that was 
sufficient to cost them their majority. This 
time, Labour proved far less demanding, and in 
a real breakthrough, Den Uyl agreed to serve 
as minister in a cabinet led by van Agt. 
The coalition of CDA. Labour, and D’GG 
had hardly begun its work before it fell apart 
and had to be mended by two outside econo- 
mists. Nevertheless, problems remained and 
when no agreement could be reached on the 
spring budget message, Labour left the Cabinet. 
They bitterly blamed Dries van Agt for forcing 
them out. 
Leaders and Issues 
Although it had long been clear that the coali- 
tion was in trouble. the parties were somewhat 
taken by surprise by the necessity for new 
elections. The short interval since the previous 
parliamentary elections, during which provin 
cial and municipal elections had been held, had 
left the party electoral chests depleted. Little 
time was available to write or rewrite party 
manifestos. Basically, they were unprepared, 
and nowhere was this more obvious than in the 
questions of selection of an individual to head 
the electoral ticket. The governmental parties 
had been too preoccupied with the problems 
within the Cabinet to consider the important 
matter of succession. 
Within the CDA, the position of van Agt 
was quite secure. Yet he himself hesitated. and 
when he finally agreed he reserved the right to 
leave the Cabinet before the completion of the 
full four years. Labour hesitated openly before 
asking Den Uyl to head the list for the sixth 
GALEN IRWLN 71 
time. There was considerable discussion and 
pressure for new leadership, but no time to 
agree upon whom the new leader was to be. 
Jan Terlouw had virtually saved D’66 from 
oblivion, but once he became minister of 
economic affairs was attacked strongly in the 
press and even within his own party. Only after 
party leaders prevailed upon him did he consent 
to head the party ticket. 
More by chance than plan, it was the Liberal 
Party which provided the only new face at the 
election. Due primarily to personal reasons, 
Hans Wiegel had resigned to become Queen’s 
Commissioner in the province of Friesland. The 
party selected the even younger Ed Nijpels (32) 
to succeed him. As the only new face, media 
attention centred, perhaps even unwittingly, on 
Nijpels. He was young, charming, and virtually 
untouched by the political wars. In debate he 
needed only to hold his own to come out a 
winner against the veterans. He did so admir- 
ably, making his opponents look old and tired 
in the process. 
The Issues 
The issue most in the minds of all at this 
election was the difficult economic situation. In 
a country in which a major portion of the GNP 
passes through the collective sector, economic 
problems immediately involve major questions 
concerning the budget. For all of the discus- 
sions over the budget and economy, all parties 
were agreed on the basic goals. Unemployment 
had to be reduced, and the market sector 
revived. As such, the economy formed what 
has been called a ‘valence issue’ in which 
parties compete to present the best image to the 
voters. It is not these goals, but the means to 
achieve them, upon which the disagreement 
occurs. Yet, even on one of the means, there 
was basic agreement; wage costs had to decline 
in order for Dutch industry to become more 
competitive. Moreover, all parties agreed on 
the necessity to reduce governmental expendi- 
tures, although not on where the cuts should 
be made or how much they should be. These 
latter questions, combined with what to do with 
the amounts saved, were the questions which 
caused the fall of the Cabinet and carried over 
into the electoral campaign. 
In the Cabinet the Christian Democrats and 
D’66 had desired greater cuts than had Labour. 
The Liberal opposition had long maintained 
that governmental expenditures had got out of 
hand, and were not sure if even the proposed 
cuts would be sufficient. Where to cut caused 
even more difficulties in the Cabinet and among 
the parties. Disagreements were strong on 
whether social welfare benefits could or should 
be lowered and on which income classes should 
lose the most purchasing power. D’66 proposed 
a freeze on all salaries for four years. The 
Socialists wished to minimize the burden falling 
on those with the lowest incomes and/or on 
welfare. The Christian Democrats felt only the 
‘true’ minimum wage earners (i.e. those 
supporting other persons) should be exempted 
from loss in purchasing power. Whether or not 
or how much the salaries of governmental 
employees would be cut formed another area of 
considerable disagreement. 
Finally, the parties argued over what use 
would be made of the money saved by such 
budgetary cuts. In the Cabinet, the CDA 
minister of finance desired to utilize the cuts to 
reduce the large budget deficit, thus reducing 
the need for further heavy borrowing. The 
Socialists argued that salary cuts were only 
acceptable if it could be shown that new jobs 
were thereby created. 
In the end, the debate on economic issues 
was probably too complicated and technical to 
be understood by most voters. What most 
voters surely did understand, however, were 
the ideological positions upon which such issue 
positions were based and the potential class 
benefits which were implied. 
After economic issues, the set of issues 
uppermost m the minds of Dutch voters in 
1982 concerned peace and nuclear weapons. It 
may have divided the parties even more greatly 
than the economic issues. In recent years public 
opinion has become more neutralist and 
opposed to nuclear weapons, and the parties 
have been forced to take this fact into account. 
Of course, peace and even moral opposition to 
nuclear weapons is likewise a valence issue; 
everyone is agreed on the necessity of the one 
and the horror of the other. The disagreement 
is on the means to achieve peace, i.e. whether 
participation in NATO and the balance of 
terror are the proper means. Opposition has 
centred around the activities of the Inter- 
denominational Peace Conference (IKV) and 
their slogan ‘Nuclear weapons out of the world, 
beginning in the Netherlands’. 
Of the major parties, the Labour Party has 
faced the greatest difficulty with regard to the 
peace issue. On its left are those parties (Com- 
munists, Pacifists, Radicals) who would rid The 
Netherlands of nuclear weapons, and restrict or 
eliminate participation in NATO. Since there is 
considerable sympathy for these positions 
among Labour voters, there is always a poten- 
tiality for loss of votes. Yet if it were to adopt 
such an extremist position it would undoubt- 
edly lose more moderate voters to parties such 
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as D’66. This dilemma was faced with difficulty 
in the adoption of the party platform in 1981. 
Then, Den Uyl had so feared that the party 
congress would accept the absolutist position of 
total rejection that he almost uncharacteristic- 
ally put his own personal prestige on the line. 
He was willing to agree to dropping some of 
the Dutch nuclear tasks within NATO, but 
insisted that one or two must be continued. In 
the end he prevailed and was chosen to lead the 
ticket, but not without internal party dissen 
sion. Furthermore, he opened the possibility of 
attack from the Left who sloganed ‘A vote for 
Labour is a vote for Joop Atom’. 
Ironically, in 1982, with nothing changed in 
the party’s position. its electoral position was 
improved. The party congress avoided new 
dissension by adopting the platform plank of 
the previous year without discussion. In the 
campaign the party could avoid the negative 
(for the Left) image of the retention of nuclear 
tasks, and concentrate on its unequivocal rcjec 
tion of the placement of cruise missiles. A 
defensive position was thus turned into an 
offensive one. 
However. whereas the electoral position of 
Labour was hereby improved, its possibilities 
for joining a new coalition were certainly not. 
Their closest ally among the major parties was 
D’66 who also would reduce the nuclear tasks 
and opposed deployment of middle range 
rocketry. but would reconsider the latter dism 
cussion after the negotiations with the USSR 
were completed. The Christian Democrats 
partly because of internal disagreement caused 
by the Interdenominational Peace Conference 
and its position, wished to postpone any 
decision until the results of the Geneva talks 
were known. Clearly there were conditions 
under which the new weapbns would be 
accepted. and the conference even advised 
religious voters to cast a vote for one of the 
parties of the left. 
To the Liberals NATO membership re- 
mained fundamental. They were opposed to 
unilateral disarmament and were willing to 
accept the cruise missiles if the Soviet Union 
were unwilling to reduce its number of middle 
range weapons. 
The Results 
The polls had followed the preferences of voters 
since the May 1981 elections and through the 
provincial and municipal elections of 1982. By 
summer 1982 the contours of rather major 
shifts had become increasingly obvious. The 
accuracy of modern polls has taken much of the 
surprise out of the election results. Neverthe- 
less the race between PvdA and CDA to 
become the largest party was so close that even 
the generally extremely accurate TV election 
night prognosis made the wrong choice. The 
final results, compared with the results of May 
1981. are presented in Table 2. 
The shifts were the greatest for D’66 and the 
Liberals. D’66 had seen great heights and depths 
in its short history. In 1981 it reached its peak 
with 1 I per cent of the vote and 17 seats in the 
Second Chamber: in 1982 the party was back 
to its position of ten years before with only 6 
parliamentary seats (4.3 per cent of the vote). It 
had apparently paid an extremely heavy price 
for its year in the government. The big winners 











Percentage of Parliamentary 
valid votes seats 
1982 1981 1982 1981 
(Labour) 30.4 28.3 47 44 
(Christian Democrats) 29.3 30.8 45 48 
(Liberals) 23.1 17.3 36 26 
4.3 11.1 6 17 
(Communist) 1.8 2.1 
(Pacifist Socialist) 2.3 2.1 : : 
(Radical) 1.6 2.0 2 3 
(Reformed Political 
Federation) 1.5 1.3 2 2 
0.8 0.8 1.9 2 0 : : 
(Evangelical People’s 
Party) 0.7 0.5 1 0 
Centre Party 0.8 0.2 1 0 
__--.- 
Turnout % 80.6 86.6 
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were the Liberals, with a gain of 10 seats in 
Parliament. Now, the three largest parties were 
more evenly balanced than ever. 
The Labour Party recovered dramatically 
from the disheartening results of the provincial 
elections, receiving almost a full 10 per cent 
more of the total vote than in 1981. This 
result has been exceeded only twice in the 
party’s history. It won the battle with the 
CDA, becoming the largest party with two 
seats more than the Christian Democrats. The 
latter lost 3 seats in comparison with 1981. 
The changes among the smaller parties were 
minor. Only the Radicals, who lost one seat, 
were changed from 1981. Two new parties did 
enter the Chamber. The Evangelical People’s 
Party, which sees itself to the left of the CDA, 
managed to obtain one seat. So did the Centre 
Party, to the distress of most observers. This 
party is ‘centre’ in name only, as its philosophy 
relies heavily upon fears of foreign workers and 
foreign cultural influences and leans in the 
direction of racism and fascism. 
Analysis 
The most direct question generally asked when 
examining election results, especially when the 
shifts are as great as these just mentioned, is 
how did they come about? From what parties 
did the gains come? Where did the votes from 
the losers go? What effects did new voters 
have? 
Unfortunately, although the first two ques- 
tions are among the most direct, they are often 
difficult to analyse. They require an accurate 
knowledge of voters’ choices at two points in 
time. Where one is able to ask the same indi- 
vidual voters their preferences at the time of 
the two elections, the problem is reduced to 
those difficulties usually encountered in panel 
survey analysis. More often, however, one is 
forced to ask a respondent to recall his or her 
preference at a prior point in time. Research is 
accumulating to demonstrate that voters, at 
least in The Netherlands, are not easily able to 
do this.3 
Panel data for the 198111982 pair of 
elections will eventually be available, but at this 
time analysis of voter shifts can only be based 
upon the results of the election day analysis 
carried out for the National Broadcasting 
System. At 40 polling stations, voters are asked 
upon leaving the booths to indicate their vote 
just cast, their vote at the previous parlia- 
mentary election, and their sex and age. These 
data thus have the additional disadvantage that 
non-voters at the current election are not 
included. 
Given these caveats we may examine the 
figures in Figure 1, which are based upon those 
voters in 1982 who were able and willing to 
report their vote in 1981. For ease of presenta- 
tion, the small parties of the Left and Right 
have been combined. 
All figures in Figure 1 are percentages based 
upon the total number of voters involved. In 
each circle is the percentage of votes gained 
from other parties and lost to other parties. 
Thus, by subtracting the losses from the gains, 
one can see that in the overall interchanges 
between the parties, the Liberals and Labour 
gained whereas the Christian Democrats and 
D’66 lost, the latter dramatically. The arrows 
indicate the percentage of the total number of 
voters flowing in both directions between each 
of the pairs of parties. 
D’66 suffered a net loss in all directions. 
Although one might presume from examina- 
tion of the overall results that D’66 voters had 
gone over to the Liberals, these figures indicate 
that the net loss to Labour was actually greater. 
Evidence is lacking, but one may guess that 
many of these were Labour voters who had 
temporarily deserted the party in 198 1. Those 
moving to the Liberals are more likely to be 
new to that party, having used D’66 as a stop- 
over in the shift between parties. 
Aside from the net gain in the interchange 
with D’66, the Liberals gained substantially 
from the Christian Democrats. Whereas the net 
changes for D’66 were all negative, those for 
the Liberals were almost all positive. Only some 
loss of votes to the Centre Party may have 
brought a small net loss in the direction of the 
splinter right parties. 
The other major parties-Labour and 
CDA-had both net gains and losses. Labour 
gained from D’66, CDA and the small left, but 
lost to the Liberals and the Centre Party of the 
splinter right. The Christian Democrats gained 
only in the interchanges with D’66, while losing 
in all other interchanges, of which the loss to 
the Liberals was the largest. 
If we arrange the parties from Left to Right 
and look at the total shifts, we do not find a 
massive shift to the Right. The movement from 
Left to Right is greater than from Right to Left, 
but the net result is only 1.24 per cent. 
Two groups are not included in these inter- 
change figures, but may be examined from the 
INTOMART survey. Table 3 reports results 
for those who reported not having voted at the 
1981 election and for those who were then too 
young to vote. These figures add considerably 
to the understanding of the gains for the 
Liberals and the recovery of Labour. Labour did 
extremely well among those who reported not 
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FIGURE 1. Vote shifts between 1981 and 1982 elections; based 1982 voters reporting upon vote 
in 1981. Source: Parliamentary Election Study, 8 September 1982, INTOMART, BV. 
having voted in 1981. (Could some of these 
respondents, however, have been referring to 
the provincial elections at which Labour did so 
badly?) The Liberals did proportionally better 
among both groups in comparison with those 
having voted twice. Pollster Maurice de Hond 
has also reported that the turnout among 1981 
Liberal voters was proportionally higher, so 
they may also have profited on that account4 
Youth Vote 
In Table 3 one can see that those voting for the 
first time differed considerably in their vote 
preferences from their elders. In fact, among 
this group, the Liberals form the largest party. 
Since age is one of the two or three pieces of 
information which INTOMART has also col- 
lected on election day, it is possible to examine 
the changing preferences of the youngest voters 
over the past 10 years. 
The categorization of age has been changed 
in the various studies, but in Table 4, it is at 
least possible to examine the preferences of the 
youngest voters at each election. The most 
obvious conclusion to be drawn was already 
mentioned in the introduction and concerns the 
lack of continuity in the preferences of the 
youngest voters and their diversion from their 
parents’ preferences. Without meaning to 
sound critical, one might conclude that young 
voters are ‘fad’ voters. ‘Fad’ voting can be 
found among all voters, but is particularly 
strong among young voters who have not yet 
developed any strong loyalty to a party. 
In 1971, D’66 and DS’70 were dispropor- 
tionately popular with the youngest voters. 
Only a year later it was the Radical Party (with 
its attractive leader, Bas de Gaay Fortman) 
which was strong. In 1977, Labour reached its 
peak with the help of the youth vote, only to 
fall back again in 1981 when D’66 was again 
‘in’. In 1982, D’66 was ‘out’ and the Liberals 
were riding high. For the first time in this 
period, the combined vote for the Left among 
the youngest voters fell below 50 per cent. 
Although young voters show a high level of 
‘fad’ voting, one must also note the continuity. 
In particular, these figures at least partially 
contradict those who have argued that the 
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TABLE 3. Vote in 1982 of those too young, non-voters, and those having also voted in 1981 
Too young Non-voter 
in 1981 In 1981 
Small Left 15.4 9.9 
PvdA (Labour) 23.8 40.8 
D’66 5.1 3.3 
CDA (Christian Democrats) 19.7 14.2 
VVD (Liberals) 30.6 26.4 
Small Right 4.3 3.7 
Other 1.0 1.9 
99.9 100.2 
N 549 1056 












TABLE 4. Vote preferences of youngest voters (1971.1982) 
Major 
Election year Agegroup CPN PSP PvdA PPR D’66 religious VVD DS’70 Other 
parties 
(CDA) 
1971 21-22 4 8 20 4 15 27 8 8 6 100% 








17 2 2 99% 
25 18 21 
19 :: 
1 6 100% 
1982 18-24 3 5 26 3 5 1 7 99% 
Source: INTOMART parliamentary election studies. 
Christian Democrats are greying and will even- leaders of the possibilities of a Labour-CDA or 
tually die out. It is true that younger voters a Labour-Liberal combination, in both cases 
cast proportionately fewer votes for the CDA with the possible inclusion of D’66. The 
than do their elders, but in each of these Liberals indicated that they were not interested 
elections approximately 20 per cent have voted and considered such talks a waste of time. Van 
CDA. The balance may be changing, but the Kemenade soon was forced to conclude that no 
three largest parties remain the most popular basis was available for a coalition including the 
among these youngest voters. Socialists. 
Cabinet Formation 
Although the Labour Party succeeded in its 
goal of becoming the largest party, it was not 
able to prevent the combination of CDA and 
Liberals from obtaining sufficient parliamentary 
seats to possibly form a majority government. 
Since the CDA had rather uncharacteristically 
implied a preference for the Liberals prior to 
the election, it seemed quite likely that they 
would combine to form the new government. 
Yet with the Socialists as the largest party, 
most agreed that the Queen should first ask 
someone from that party to inform her of the 
possibilities of forming a government. 
The former minister of education, Jos van 
Kemenade, was asked by the Queen to investi- 
gate the possibilities. He talked with party 
These possibilities having failed, the CDA- 
Liberal combination was investigated. In rela- 
tively short time, by Dutch standards, these 
parties agreed on a governmental programme. 
In recognition of its loyalty in remaining in the 
previous cabinet, D’66 was asked if it wished to 
join. D’66 declined the offer. The biggest sur- 
prise of this period of the formation was the 
announcement of minister president van Agt 
that he would accept no post in the new 
Cabinet, but would take a place on the parlia- 
mentary back benches. His successor became 
Ruud Lubbers who quickly completed the pro- 
cess of dividing the ministerial posts and select- 
ing the new Cabinet. On 4 November, the new 
government of eight Christian Democratic and 
six Liberal ministers was installed by The 
Queen. The 1982 electoral process was thereby 
concluded. 
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The Spanish General Election of 1982 
J. BLONDEI. 
Professor of Government, University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, England 
AND 
E. ESEVERRI HUALDE 
Centro de Investigaciones Tecnicas y Politicas, Madrid 
The Spanish General Election of 1982 resulted 
in the third consecutive overwhelming Socialist 
victory in Southern Europe-not an area 
hitherto dominated by Socialist governments. 
The political map of Europe is being drastically 
redrawn: Socialists are losing in their traditional 
strongholds of the North and are gaining in the 
South: of five governments wholly or mainly 
controlled by Socialist parties, three are now in 
Southern Europe; and only two of the five 
Southern European countries are not controlled 
by Socialist governments. 
This development is in itself a change of 
such a magnitude that it needs to be studied 
comparatively, accompanied as it seems to be 
by the decline of Communist parties in their 
traditional strongholds.’ But the Spanish 
General Election of 1982 is not only important 
because it gave the Spanish Socialist Working 
Party (PSOE) of Felipe Gonzales an absolute 
majority of seats in the Cortks: it also had the 
effect-unprecedented in Western Europe-of 
destroying almost completely a party, the 
Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD), which 
had been not merely the largest party, but 
indeed a near-majority party. The electoral and 
parliamentary map of Spain has been recast at 
the same time on both Left and Right. Indeed, 
if one adds the marked decline of the Spanish 
Communist Party (PCE) as well as some of the 
smaller nationalist and regionalist parties, the 
Spanish General Election of 1982 has been 
characterized by five developments, each of 
which would probably be sufficient in impor- 
tance to qualify that election as ‘critical’. 
First, the PSOE increased its popular vote by 
78 per cent-from under 5.5 million to 9.8 
million-and its percentage by 50 per cent- 
